Lesson 6 · Universals and particulars, concepts and instances

Source: Book pp. 24–26.

1. Juzʾī and kullī

We meet individual things through the senses: "Muḥammad", "this book", "this pen". Each of these concepts fits one thing only. Comparing many individuals, the mind notices what they share and forms a concept that fits all of them: "human", "animal", "mineral".

• Juzʾī (particular): a concept that cannot apply to more than one.
• Kullī (universal): a concept that can apply to more than one.

The refinement (p. 24). What counts is what the concept in itself allows, not how many instances actually exist. So the full definitions are:

• Kullī: a concept that can, in itself, apply to more than one.
• Juzʾī: a concept that in itself applies to one only.

This matters in three cases:

ʿAqīda link. The concept "necessary existent", or "god", does not by itself rule out more than one. That only one can exist is proven by a separate proof: the proofs of tawḥīd, such as the argument from mutual hindrance in "Had there been within them gods besides Allah, they would both have been ruined" (al-Anbiyāʾ 21:22). This is why tawḥīd is argued for, not merely defined.

Which words give which? Proper names and demonstratives ("this") give particulars; generic nouns give universals; the meanings of particles are particular.

2. True and relative particulars

• Juzʾī ḥaqīqī (true particular): a single individual: Zayd.
• Juzʾī iḍāfī (relative particular): any concept that is narrower than another concept above it, even if it is itself a universal. "Straight line" and "curved line" are relative particulars of "line". Human is a relative particular of animal; animal of growing body; growing body of body.

Zayd is a true particular, and also a relative particular when compared with "human". Every true particular is a relative particular, but not the other way round.

3. Mutawāṭiʾ and mushakkik

• Mutawāṭiʾ (univocal): the universal applies equally to all its instances. ʿUmar is not "more human" than Khālid; they differ in height or strength, but not in humanity.
• Mushakkik (graded): the universal applies unequally. Its instances differ in it:
  • by strength: the whiteness of snow is greater than the whiteness of paper;
  • by priority: a cause exists before its effect;
  • by being more fundamental: the existence of the Creator is more fundamental than the existence of creation.

ʿAqīda link. "Allah exists" and "the chair exists" use the same word, but "existence" is not univocal here: Allah's existence is necessary, eternal and from Himself; the chair's is possible, originated and given to it. A shared word never forces a shared degree, let alone a shared reality. Keep this in mind for "There is nothing like unto Him" (al-Shūrā 42:11); Lesson 9 adds the second half of the answer.

4. Mafhūm and miṣdāq

• Mafhūm (concept): the meaning itself, the image in the mind.
• Miṣdāq (instance): the thing the concept is true of.

Three observations from the book's examples:

1. "Muḥammad" is a particular concept; its instance is one person. So a concept can be universal or particular.
2. "Animal" is a universal concept; its instances are humans, horses, birds. So an instance can be a true particular (this horse) or a relative particular (the species "horse").
3. "Non-existence" is a universal concept whose instances do not exist at all. So an instance does not have to exist.

5. The title and the titled: two kinds of predication

When you judge something, you may be speaking about the concept itself, or using the concept as a title (ʿunwān) for the individuals under it (the muʿanwan).

• Primary predication (ḥaml awwalī): subject and predicate are one concept; one is just vaguer and the other more detailed. "The human is a rational animal."
• Common predication (ḥaml shāʾiʿ): subject and predicate are different concepts that meet in the same individuals. "The human is an animal." "Humans are in loss." Your gaze passes through the concept to the people it names. This is the normal kind in the sciences.

Three puzzles solved by this distinction

1. The grammarians say: "Nothing is predicated of the verb." But that sentence predicates something of "the verb"! Answer: the concept "verb" is a noun and can be talked about. The judgment uses it as a title for actual verbs ("he hit", "he hits"), and of those nothing is predicated.
2. The logicians say: "A particular cannot be predicated of many." Yet we say Zayd is a particular, this book is a particular, Makkah is a particular. Answer: the concept "particular" is itself a universal (it fits many). Its instances, taken one by one, are particulars, and the rule is about them.
3. Uṣūl al-fiqh says: "The mujmal (vague text) has no clear meaning." Yet you just defined it clearly. Answer: the concept "mujmal" is clear; its instances are what is vague.

ʿAqīda link. How can we say "a partner of Allah is impossible" if there is no such partner to talk about? We use the concept as a title, and the judgment says that the title has no possible instance. The concept exists in the mind; the thing it names cannot exist anywhere.

Quiz 6

1. Kullī or juzʾī? a) "Makkah" b) "city" c) "a partner of the Creator" d) "this pen" e) "the Necessary Existent"
2. If only one Necessary Existent can exist, why is the concept still a universal? What does this tell us about how tawḥīd is established?
3. Explain why every true particular is a relative particular, but not every relative particular is a true particular.
4. Mutawāṭiʾ or mushakkik? a) "human" b) "white" c) "existence" d) "triangle"
5. Give the concept and two instances of "prophet". Can an instance fail to exist? Give an example of a concept with no instances.
6. Primary or common predication? a) "Man is a rational animal" b) "Man is mortal" c) "The believer is a muslim"
7. Solve the puzzle: "The word 'mujmal' is defined clearly, so how can the mujmal have no clear meaning?"
8. Review: is "I free this slave" a khabar or an inshāʾ?